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draw inferences about positive characteristics of the victim from
items he had in his possession at the time of his death. Gathers, at
2211.
Previous Virginia cases have indicated that quantity alone may
be insufficient to establish a particular battery as "aggravated."
Barnes v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 130, 360 S.E.2d 196 (1987)
(noting that when multiple gun shots are the cause of death, proper
classification as an aggravated battery would require that the victim
survived the first shot, and that an appreciable time passed between
the first and final shot causing death). The fact that the nature of the
attack must be considered is also evidenced by a holding that the
vileness factor was met when the "[w]ound was inflicted in a savage
and methodical manner." Stout v. Commonwealth, 237 Va. 126, 376
S.E.2d 288 (1989) (single and deep slash in the victim's throat caused
a slow painful death). The evidence in Boggs may not be seen as the
best for presenting the distinction between the culpability of a
defendant and the method employed in the murder. Boggs not only
inflicted many blows to the victim, but also switched weapons during
the attack. In fact, his principal argument that the attack was not both
quantitatively AND qualitatively sufficient to establish aggravated
battery centered on his contention that he was simply unsuccessful in
trying to find the quickest way of killing the victim. Boggs, at 19.
Practitioners should continue to object to both the Virginia
model jury instructions, which contain no narrowing construction of
the statutory terms, and to either the Smith or Boggs narrowing
construction of aggravated battery.
(2) VOIR DIRE
Boggs also claimed that the trial court erred when the judge
failed personally to question and attempt to rehabilitate potential
jurors who indicated that they would under no circumstances vote for
the death sentence. Id. at 28. In holding that the trial court did not err
and dismissing Boggs' claim as being without merit, the Fourth
Circuit stated that not only was it proper to exclude jurors who could
not follow judicial instructions due to their own moral views, but also
that a judge has no constitutional duty to rehabilitate apparently
disqualified veniremen. Id. It should be noted that although the trial
judge did not attempt to rehabilitate through personal questioning
those jurors indicating an aversion to the death penalty, he did, as is
all too common, question and rehabilitate one juror who originally
indicated that she felt death was ordinarily the proper punishment for
murder. Boggs, 695 F. Supp. at 874.
It is clear from this holding that defense counsel must assume
responsibility for further questioning of jurors with reservations about
the death penalty. Practitioners should elicit agreement that the juror
could follow the instructions of the court and consider the death
penalty. If possible, this agreement should be elicited, repeated,
reinforced and emphasized on the record. Further, any defense
objection to the disqualification of a potential juror for cause should
be placed on the record. Also, objections to refusal to excuse an
unqualified pro-death juror should be renewed at the time the jury is
impaneled. See, summary of Hoke v. Commonwealth, 2 Capital
Defense Digest 18 (Nov. 1989).
(3) PREJUDICIAL STATEMENTS IN STATE'S CLOSING
ARGUMENTS
In reversing the district court's holding, the Fourth Circuit held
that the Judge's decision NOT to require redaction of racial state-
ments contained in Boggs' confession before allowing the prosecutor
to read the confession to the jury was proper, and did not prejudice
the defendant during either the guilt or sentencing phases of his trial.
Id. at 36. The rationale of the district court was that although the error
was harmless during the guilt phase due to the overwhelming
evidence against the defendant, the racial comments were improper
and highly prejudicial during the sentencing phase. Boggs, 695 F.
Supp. at 870.
The district court stated that "Boggs' racial views have no
bearing on the culpability of this particular act." Id. However, the
Fourth Circuit dismissed this claim, observing that the comments
amounted to only a few lines from a multi-page closing argument and
that the Commonwealth's Attorney "defused the racial character of
Boggs' language" by explaining that the comments indicated a threat
to persons of any race. Boggs, at 35.
It should be noted that although Boggs ultimately lost this
claim on the merits, the district court explicitly, and the Fourth
Circuit implicitly, found over the Commonwealth's objection that the
claim was properly made and preserved on federal grounds and was
not procedurally defaulted. Boggs, 695 F. Supp. at 869. Virginia
practitioners should note that, especially during the sentencing phase,
ANY evidence not relevant to defendant's individual moral culpabil-
ity should be objected to on federal grounds and preserved on the
record. This includes such evidence that is included in the defen-
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Note: Direct page citations for the Fourth Circuit's opinion are to Westlaw, 1990 WL 6403.
FACTS
Roger Keith Coleman was arrested and charged with the rape
and capital murder of Wanda Faye Thompson McCoy. After being
convicted on both charges and sentenced to death, Coleman appealed
to the Supreme Court of Virginia. Upon review, the Court affirmed
both his conviction and sentence. Coleman v. Commonwealth, 226
Va. 31, 307 S.E.2d 864 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1109 (1984).
Coleman applied for a writ of habeas corpus in the state
Circuit Court, which denied the writ after an evidentiary hearing.
After 31 days, Coleman filed an appeal of the order denying the writ
with the Supreme Court of Virginia. He also filed a motion with the
state habeas court to "correct" the date of its final judgment. The state
habeas court denied the motion to change the date of final judgment,
and on the state's motion, the Supreme Court of Virginia dismissed
Coleman's appeal as untimely. Again, the Supreme Court denied
certiorari. Coleman v. Bass, 484 U.S. 918 (1987).
Asserting 11 claims of error, Coleman applied for a writ of
habeas corpus in the United States District Court. Without conducting
an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied habeas relief and
dismissed seven of the claims as procedurally barred. Coleman then
initiated this appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the
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HOLDING
In this appeal, Coleman asserted that the District Court erred
(1) by holding that his claims were procedurally barred, (2) by
holding that his claims were meritless without first conducting an
evidentiary hearing, and (3) by holding that the death penalty was
constitutionally imposed.
Affirming the District Court's holding, the Fourth Circuit
relying on Wainwrightv. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), stated "[a] state
habeas petitioner who fails to meet the requirements of state
procedural law, and who has his petition dismissed on that basis by
the last state court to review it, loses federal review of the federal
claims raised in the state petition in the absence of cause and
prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice." Coleman v.
Thompson, Westlaw at 4 (1990). The Fourth Circuit also affirmed the
district court's holding that it was unnecessary to conduct an
evidentiary hearing on issues NOT raised on direct appeal from the
decision of the state habeas court since, Coleman's notice of appeal
of the denial of the writ was untimely. Further, the Fourth Circuit
held that not only were Coleman's constitutional claims barred from
review, but that his sentence was lawfully imposed. Id. at 12.
ANALYSIS
(1) PROCEDURAL BAR
The Supreme Court of Virginia and the Federal District Court
based their holdings on Virginia Supreme Court Rule 5:9(a). Id. at 3.
Rule 5:9(a) states in part:
No appeal shall be allowed unless, within 30 days
after entry of final judgment or other appealable order
or decree, counsel for the appellant files with the clerk
of the trial court a notice of appeal.
Coleman asserted three alternative grounds on which the
Fourth Circuit could reverse the holding of the District Court that his
claims were procedurally barred. First he asserted that Rule 5:9(a) is
ambiguous, and that the Supreme Court of Virginia's dismissal of his
appeal for the denial of the writ was "based on [a] novel reading" of
the Rule. Id. at 2. In reviewing this claim, the Fourth Circuit stated
that the state habeas court entered its denial on September 4, 1986.
Id. at 4. Coleman filed his notice appeal on October 7, 1986 which,
according to the time allotted by Virginia Code § 1-133, was one day
late. Id.
The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that "Procedural default can
be invoked by the state only when 'the state court's opinion contains
a plain statement that [its] decision rests upon adequate and inde-
pendent state grounds."' Id. at 5 (quoting Harris v. Reed, 109 S. Ct.
1038, 1042 (1989). However, the Fourth Circuit analyzed the
Supreme Court of Virginia's order and found that the court consid-
ered the proper factors, and that it was a sufficiently plain statement
that the sole ground for the Commonwealth's motion to dismiss was
Coleman's failure to comply with Rule 5:9. The Fourth Circuit also
affirmed the district court's decision that Coleman's failure to adhere
to Rule 5:9 was an adequate and independent state ground to apply
the procedural bar. Id. at 4.
The Fourth Circuit also held that, contrary to Coleman's
contention, Rule 5:9 is not ambiguous, and the court's reading of the
rule was not unique. Id. at 6. Coleman claimed that the rule was
vague in that it was unclear whether the date entered referred to the
date of issuance, or the date upon which the order was recorded. The
Fourth Circuit summarily dealt with this claim by noting that the date
of issuance was noted immediately above the Judge's signature, and
by stating that "Mhe final order...was entered on the date the judge
signed the order and that the time for appeal started running from that
date." Id. at 7 (citing Peyton v. Ellyson, 207 Va. 423, 430-431
(1966)).
Coleman's second asserted ground for reversal of the District
Court was based on his reliance on Fay v. Noia that the rule of
procedural default is not applicable when a petitioner's late filing did
not represent a deliberate attempt to bypass the courts. Id. at 7 (citing
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963)). The Fourth Circuit held that
"[F]ederal consideration of the defaulted claims should be determined
by the cause and prejudice standards of Wainwright v. Sykes." Id.
(citing Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,485-492 (1986)). That is,
was there cause for Coleman's non-compliance with 5:9 and if so,
would a different outcome have been likely. The court observed that
a deliberate bypass issue would have been presented only if Coleman
had not attempted to appeal the denial of state habeas.
Coleman's third assertion was that his counsel's error in
failing to file a timely notice of appeal from the state habeas court's
denial of the writ constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at
8. The Fourth Circuit, citing Murray v. Giarratano, stated that a
"state prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus does not have a
constitutional right to counsel." Id. (citing Murray v. Giarratano, 109
S. Ct. 2765 (1989)); see also, 2 Capital Defense Digest 8 (Nov.
1989). The Court then held that since Coleman had no constitutional
right to counsel, he could not show cause that he had been denied
effective assistance of counsel. Id. at 9. Further, the Court stated that
since the evidence of Coleman's guilt was "beyond a reasonable
doubt," he could not avoid the procedural bar by claiming a funda-
mental miscarriage of justice. Id.
(2) DENIAL OF EVIDENTIARY HEARING
The second issue raised by Coleman was whether the District
Court should have held an evidentiary hearing prior to dismissing his
claims. Coleman asserted that one of the jurors was predisposed to
find him guilty, and that the state court did not resolve factual
disputes regarding his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id.
at 10. The Fourth Circuit noted that neither of these issues was raised
on direct appeal from the state habeas court and consequently, were
procedurally barred due to the untimely notice of appeal and are
ineligible for further review in a federal court. Id. Further, the Court
stated that since further review was barred, the District Court was not
required to conduct an evidentiary hearing on those issues. Id.
Although the District Court decided that an evidentiary hearing
was not required, it nevertheless reviewed Coleman's additional
claims and found them to be without merit. Id. at 11. Further, the
Fourth Circuit noted that Coleman did not raise these issues on direct
appeal from the state habeas court. Id. at 11. Based on Coleman's
failure to adhere to Rule 5:9, the court found the claims procedurally
barred from review. Id.
(3) CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM
Coleman's final issue on appeal was that the death penalty was
not constitutionally imposed. Id. at 12. He asserted that not only did
the record fail to support the finding that the jury unanimously found
the existence of an aggravating factor, but also that the trial court did
not provide the jury with a constitutionally adequate limiting
construction for Virginia's vileness predicate of the capital sentenc-
ing statute, § 19.2-264.2. Id. The Fourth Circuit noted that Coleman
failed to object to the jury instruction at trial and that he also failed to
raise the issue on direct appeal from the state habeas court. Therefore
the Fourth Circuit found that the District Court did not err, and that
Coleman's claims were procedurally barred from federal review. Id.
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The Fourth Circuit also addressed the constitutionality of
Coleman's sentence. The Court stated that a jury trial is not constitu-
tionally required for imposition of the death penalty, and that the
determination of its appropriateness may be made by an appellate
court. Id. at 13 (citing Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 106 S. CL
689, 88 L. Ed. 2d 704 (1986)).
In Cabana, however, the issue was whether, on substantive
Eighth Amendment grounds, defendant was a mere accomplice who
did not kill, or intend death and was therefore in a constitutionally
protected class of defendants as defined by Enmund v. Florida, 458
U.S. 782, 102 S. Ct. 3368, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1140 (1982). The main issue
in Cabana was at what point in the criminal process an Ennund
finding must be made. Cabana, at 382. The United States Supreme
Court determined that such a finding did not require ajury and that
an appellate court could constitutionally determine whether the death
penalty was permissible under Enmund. Id. at 385, 386.
The Fourth Circuit's reliance on Cabana is curious. The
Fourth Circuit read Cabana as authority for an appellate court to
determine in place of the jury the proper application of the vileness
aggravating factor and then to impose the death penalty. Coleman, at
13. However, the United States Supreme Court has held that an
appellate court may not simply review the circumstances of the crime
and decide on its own that they are sufficient to make out this
aggravating factor. Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 363, 108 S.
Ct. 1853, 1857, 100 L. Ed. 2d 372,377 (1988). Since Maynard dealt
with the very issue raised by Coleman, it would appear to be the more
appropriate authority.
As shown by this opinion, state and federal appellate courts
require STRICT' compliance with procedural rules. Virginia practitio-
ners should note that, unlike Coleman, most appeals to the Supreme
Court of Virginia involve several claims which the court may reject
on the merits or find to be waived or defaulted. Habeas counsel
should note that for a state to invoke the doctrine of procedural
default, "[T]he state court's opinion [MUST] contain a plain
statement that its decision rests upon adequate and independent state
grounds."' Coleman, at 5 (quoting Harris v. Reed, 109 S. Ct. 1038,
1042 (1989) (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1042
(1983)). Also, counsel should note that any discrepancies or ambigui-
ties regarding this point should be resolved in favor of permitting
federal jurisdiction and review. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032,





Va.., 385 S.E.2d 850 (1989)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
This is Timothy Wilson Spencer's third capital murder trial
and appeal. Spencer I and Spencer II have been discussed in 2
CapitalDefense Digest 13, (Nov. 1989).
Spencer was convicted of capital murder, i.e., willful,
deliberate, and premeditated murder during the commission of or
subsequent to rape, of Dr. Susan Hellams. Dr. Hellams' wrists had
been tied behind her back with electrical tape. Death occurred by
"ligature strangulation." Other injuries such as a fractured nose and
marks indicating that she had been kicked with the edge of a shoe
were found. Spencer 111, 385 S.E.2d at 852. Spermatozoa were
discovered on swabs taken from the victim's vagina, rectum, and
perianal region, as well as from fluid found on the victim's skirt and
slip. Id. Serological examination revealed that the seminal fluid was
consistent with a type 0 secretor. Both Hellams and her husband
were found to be non-secretors. Id. A sample of Spencer's blood
revealed that he was a "type 0 secretor, PGM type 1, PGM subtype
1+, and peptidase A type 1." Id. However, 13% of the population
have this particular combination of blood types. Id. As in Spencer I
and Spencer I, DNA molecules from Spencer's blood sample were
compared with DNA molecules from the seminal fluid, and were
found to match. Id. at 853. No two individuals except for identical
twins have the same DNA patterns. Id. at n.1.
HOLDING
At trial, Spencer challenged the constitutionality of the death
penalty. The Virginia Supreme Court rejected this claim. Id. at 853.
Spencer also contended that the death penalty statute was "vague"
and does not specify which party carries the burden of proof of
mitigation. The Virginia Supreme Court rejected this claim as not
having been raised at trial. Id. at 854, n.3. Spencer also challenged
the exclusion of venireperson Maureen Owens. The Virginia
Supreme Court found no error in the exclusion of Owens. Id. at 854-
5. The most significant holdings were those turning aside Spencer's
challenges to the critical DNA evidence.
ANALYSIS
In this case, the "conventional" serological evidence showed
only that the rapist-murderer was a "type-O secretor." Blood tests
performed upon Spencer showed him to belong to this type. Since
13% of the population are type-O secretors, this evidence was
insufficient to prove that Spencer had committed the rape. Id. at 852.
In the absence of other forensic evidence, the DNA matching was
necessary to show that Spencer had perpetrated the crime. The
probability of error in the DNA matching process used to compare
the DNA from Spencer's blood sample to the DNA in the seminal
fluids recovered from the victim is alleged to have been one in
705,000,000. Id. at 853, n.2. Expert witnesses testified as to the
accuracy and reliability of the test. "Dr. Roberts testified unequivo-
cally that there was no disagreement in the scientific community
about the reliability of DNA print testing." Id. at 854. DNA print
testing was first at issue in Virginia as a forensic technique in
Spencer I and I, where the Virginia Supreme Court held that "DNA
testing is a reliable scientific technique." Id. at 855.
The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected Spencer's assignment
of error complaining of the trial court's limitations on the cross-
examination of Dr. Roberts. The Court noted that Spencer made no
proffer of his questions or the answers the witness would have given.
Id.
Significantly, the Court also noted that Spencer did not dispute
that the DNA testing was properly conducted. As noted above,
conventional analysis of the seminal fluid and Spencer's blood
samples did no more than allow him to be considered as a suspect; it
was the DNA matching that provided virtually conclusive evidence
of his guilt. The defense presented no evidence in the guilt phase of
the trial. Id. at 853. In other words, defense counsel made no
significant challenge to the DNA matching test procedure in general
